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Abstract: This chapter is an introduction to cyber insurance. We describe the different types or 
risks as well as uncertainty and ignorance related to cyber security. A framework for catastrophes 
on the cyber space is also presented. It is assessed which risks might be insurable or uninsurable. 
The evolution and challenges of cyber insurance are discussed and finally we propose some 
thoughts for the further development of cyber insurance markets.  
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Cyber insurance has a broad definition and has been continuously evolving over time. It was defined as 
insurance for the damages to “physical” computer equipment in 1970s, but nowadays it has been 
changed to be a cost-effective option of risk mitigation strategies for IT/cyber related losses. According 
to Association of British Insurers (ABI), it “covers the losses relating to damage to, or loss of information 
from, IT systems and networks”. Anderson et al. (2007) argue that cyber insurance in an ideal situation 
promotes users to implement good security. However, some barriers are currently preventing insurers 
to achieve this goal, and innovations in the cyberspace introduce new types of loss. For example, 
“Internet of Things” is shifting cybersecurity from protecting information assets to physical goods that 
were traditionally un-related to computers.  
At present, cyber insurance has a small share in overall non-life insurance market and represents just 
0.1% of the global Property & Casualty insurance premium pool (Marsh, 2015), but it is one of the 
fastest-growing new lines of insurance business and the cybersecurity is recognized as one of the top 
global risks in the World Economic Forum’s report recently (WEF, 2015). Meanwhile, more and more 
traditional insurance contracts exclude specific losses that are linked to cybersecurity, it is necessary to 
develop a standalone cyber-insurance market. New technologies and innovations in the cyberspace are 
also spurring the development of cyber-insurance market, as well as the current trend of government 
requiring high standards on protecting sensitive information and enforcing financial punishments 
relating to information security breaches.  
Both the complexity of cyber risk and the current immaturity of cyber-insurance market bring challenges 
for industry practitioners and regulators to fully understand potential future systemic risks in this kind of 
complex system. Not surprisingly, the recent Risk Nexus Report from Zurich Insurance Group argues that 
the global aggregations of cyber risk is analogous to those risks that were overlooked in the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage market (Zurich, 2014). Its nickname “cyber sub-prime” intends to describe the 
interconnected nature of systemic cyber risk and the challenges for individual insurers to address the 
complexity. They believe that the existing research on systemic risk in the financial markets that aims to 
address recent crises should be helpful to understand the dynamics of future cyberspace.  
2	Development	of	insurance	for	cyber	risks	
According to 2015 Information Security Breaches Survey (PWC, 2015), 90% of UK large organizations and 
74% of small businesses reported that they had suffered at least one security breach in the past one 
year. The average cost of the worst single breach suffered by these businesses has gone up sharply. For 
instance, the average cost to a large organization is around £1.5m-£3m up from £600k-£1.15m a year 
ago. The survey also indicates that the majority of UK businesses surveyed expect breaches will continue 
to increase. Thompson (2014) estimates that the total cyber insurance currently amounts around US$2 
billion, whereas the total cost of global security breaches could be more than US$400 billion. For more 
about the effects of cyber-attacks on UK companies, see (OxfordEconomics, 2014). For a more detailed 




Together with both the growth of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) and the growing 
impact of cyber risks to the real-world business increase the demand for insurance-related risk 
mitigation strategies. The following factors also play key roles in the development of cyber insurance:  
A list of key factors affecting either demand for or supply of cyber insurance: 
Mitigating cyber residual risks: Organizations have three basic cyber risk management strategies: self-
protection, self-insurance, and transfer of risk via cyber insurance (Kesan et al., 2005). While 
organizations are increasing their information security spending on improving IT system, cyber residual 
risks still require insurance to mitigate unexpected events. Lelarge and Bolot (2009) find that cyber 
insurance is a powerful incentive mechanism that motivates organizations to invest in self-protection, so 
these three strategies are complementary to each other. Pal and Golubchik (2010) analyze the Internet 
users’ investment in self-defense mechanisms when insurance solutions are offered in either full or 
partial cyber-insurance coverage models. 
Promoting and aligning economic incentives: Organizations who have insurance as a last resort of risk 
management attract customers and business partners, especially for small businesses who are parts of a 
large/long supply chain in order to avoid being the weakest link of cyber-attacks. In the supply-demand 
model of cyber-insurance market, Pal (2014) argues that cyber insurance has the potential to jointly 
align the incentives of different stakeholders in the cyberspace, such stakeholders or players as security 
vendors, cyber insurers, regulatory agencies and network users. Anderson et al. (2007) also suggest that 
cyber insurance in an ideal situation promotes users to implement good security. 
Protecting exclusions in traditional insurance: Cyber cover was mainly embedded in other traditional 
insurance products (e.g.: business interruption or professional liability insurance), but nowadays more 
and more traditional insurance contracts intend to exclude the cyber-related risks due to the complexity 
of cyberspace and potentially catastrophic consequence, as well as requiring different actuarial methods 
to preform data analysis (Siegel et al., 2002). As a result, standalone cyber-insurance policies are 
emerged. However, there is a gap between insurers and insured parties to explain the 
differences/exclusions among both standalone cyber-insurance contracts and traditional products. It is 
necessary to have cyber-insurance brokers to reduce the gap (Marsh, 2015). 
Providing professional advice and delivering experienced cyber incident response: Insurance companies 
themselves collect a huge amount of customers’ personally identifiable information and corporate 
clients’ business confidential/financial information, so they must follow and have rich experience to deal 
with many regulations of protecting data information and cyber security (e.g.: HIPAA Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act to protect the privacy of individual patients/customers, GLBA Gramm 
Leach Bliley Act to secure the private information of clients) (Appari and Johnson, 2010). Insurers also 
accumulate the updated knowledge and relevant experience from clients globally and communicate 
with other security professionals, in order to provide technical and legal assistance (as well as financial 
compensations) to manage cyber-related breaches and incidents (Marsh and Zurich, 2015). 
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Training cybersecurity awareness and building information security culture: Security managers often find 
difficulties to communicate with non-technical internal staff or external clients about security policies 
and technologies who have no formal security background, but insurance is an easy way to explain the 
(financial) impact of cybersecurity to the business. The insurance premium that has been reduced (or 
increased) year-by-year due to a better (or worse) security implementation in this year relative to other 
previous periods, it is a good indication and consistent comparison to define proper cyber risk metrics 
and to educate staff or clients. However, at this early stage of cyber insurance, there is still a lag for 
insurers to implement premium differentiation on the cyber insurance that reflects the insured security 
improvement precisely due to the immaturity of the cyber insurance market (Mukhopadhyay et al., 
2013; Moran et al., 2015). 
Government supports: A free-market approach is traditionally popular to manage risks in the financial 
system, since it increases motivation and efficiency of stakeholders in the system. As Anderson et al. 
(2007) suggest that one option to spur demand for cyber insurance is to make it compulsory (as it is 
common in motor insurance), but it may lead a deadweight on competitiveness and productivity 
growth. The role of government is to encourage and support the insurers to overcome the barriers of 
supplying cyber insurance (The barriers will be discussed in the cyber-insurance market section as 
followed). Recently, UK government launched its “10 Steps to Cyber Security” (CESG, 2012) and “Cyber 
Essentials Scheme” (BIS, 2014), both aiming to assist insurers to evaluate the security assessment of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Sharing data of cyber incidents (data pooling): It is necessary to form partnerships from different 
industries that share data in order to better understand cyber risks, as suggested in the UK Cyber 
Security Strategy (Cabinet, 2011). The recent launched Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership 
(CiSP https://www.cert.gov.uk/cisp/) aims to collaborate with insurers to analyze emerging threats, 
disaster scenarios and trends in the cyberspace. The cyber insurance will be more affordable and its 
purchasing cost is expected to be lower than current level based on more relevant actuarial data in the 
near future, and a higher degree of price differentiation across different policies and individual firms will 
be feasible (Marsh, 2015). However, Bohme (2006) states and explains that information sharing is 
socially beneficial, but it is not efficient to rely on a trusted third party only (as a “social planner”) to 
arrange data collection. 
2.2	Insurable	and	uninsurable	cyber	risks	
In terms of a specific insurance policy, the potential losses related to cyber-attacks or non-malicious IT 
failures can be currently grouped into 11 categories in the London Insurance Market (Marsh, 2015) that 
is also similar to the US market (Majuca et al., 2006). 
Due to both the difference in severity/frequency of cyber events and the complexity of cyber risks, some 
of these losses are insurable while others are not available at present. Johnson et al. (2014) study the 
complexity of estimating systematic risk in cyber networks, which is an essential requirement to provide 
cyber insurance to the public. The following discussion explains the insurability and exposure for 




Privacy events: Many privacy issues are related to managing regulatory requirements on information 
security. Insurers can collaborate with lawyers to provide different levels of services and protections to 
their clients. Since the losses from these events are handled and measured by a third-party professional 
lawyer, there is less information asymmetry or moral hazard problem between insurer and insured. 
Crime and fraud: Police force often involves in the investigation of cyber-crime and fraud, therefore the 
financial losses related to such cyber events are measured by third parties such as police or lawyers. 
Insurers can not only offer insurance cover, but also provide professional advice on preventing these 
events or reducing the cost based on their experience from other customers. 
Network security liability: Third-party liabilities related to certain security events occurring within an 
organization’s IT network can be insured, mainly due to the scope of incidents can be clearly defined by 
the insurers and IT system engineers can also collaborate with insurers to improve mitigation strategies. 
Software and data damage: Insurers can provide indemnity for the costs arising from the damage of 
data or software (e.g.: help recovering or reconstituting the damaged data), this is mainly because 
insurers are able to require the policy holders to follow necessary procedures of data backup or 
redundancy. 
Cyber extortion: Traditionally, insurers have the necessary knowledge and experience of dealing with 
extortion in the physical world and conduct ransom negotiations (particularly in the London Market, 
such as the Lloyd’s of London), extortion in the cyberspace is not much different from that. Cover is 
provided for both the cost of handling the incident and the ransom payment. 
Uninsurable	(or	insurable	but	with	constraints)	cyber	risks	
Reputational loss: Although insurance cover is available for the losses that are directly linked to 
reputational damage (e.g.: cost of recovering public image or loss revenue from existing customers), it is 
difficult to measure the value of the compensation and the linkage between the cyber incident and the 
intangible asset if without certain constraints. 
Network business interruption (e.g.: due to Denial of Service attacks): In the traditional insurance sector, 
it is common to offer full coverage for business interruption arising from natural disasters or man-made 
events. However, in the early stage of cyber insurance, insurers are concerned about the potential 
aggregate exposure from a single cyber event but interrupts many insured policy holders. 
IP theft or espionage: These types of losses are extremely difficult to prove and quantify, since the value 
is changing quickly over time and trade secret is priceless before an incident but (likely) worthless if 
being public. It is also hard to define whether the incident was incurred in the insured period. Moreover, 
these attacks are often state-sponsored with a large amount of resource. 
Physical asset damage: The interconnection between physical world and cyberspace is increased by the 
development of the so-called “Internet of Things (IoT)”, therefore more and more cyber incidents will 
directly have impacts on the physical assets. At this stage, the complexity of these interconnections is 
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not well-understood by insurers, therefore it is difficult to combine cyber insurance with traditional 
property insurance or have such physical asset damage cover in the standalone cyber insurance. 
Death and bodily injury: Similar to the physical asset damage, it is more and more likely that certain 
cyber related incidents may cause harm to the human (e.g.: medical devices, large scale industry 
equipment, driverless cars, etc.). Although it is uninsurable at the current stage of cyber insurance, it is 
covered by traditional insurance products such as general liability and employers’ liability products. 
 
Figure 1: Size distribution of data losses (based on data from datalossdb 2000-2005). Expected number of losses per year 
larger than a certain size as a function of number of records lost. Note the power-law heavy tail for larger losses (exponent ≈ 
-0.66, consistent with the results in (Overill & Silomon 2011, Mailart & Sornette 2010)). This tail may be dominated by more 




Even if insurers are able to offer cyber insurance to mitigate certain types of cyber-risk events, they 
must face and learn to overcome some challenges in order to maintain and expand their businesses. Not 




External attackers are evolving over time: Information Security Breaches Survey (PWC, 2015) shows that 
outsiders are using more sophisticated methods to affect organizations. 
Staff-related breaches are unique in individual cases: Whether inadvertent human error or not, the 
consequence from insiders’ mistakes or misconducts is difficult for insurers to measure.  
Lack of understanding and communication: Recent surveys indicate that a majority of CEOs believe their 
organizations have relevant insurance to cover cyber risks (PWC, 2015) whereas in fact only around 10% 
actually do (Marsh, 2015). 
Increasing IT system collaboration and social network: Cyberspace is moving towards an ecosystem, 
which has more and more heterogeneous players collaborate and interact to each other. 
New technologies and innovations: The ICT sector is attractive to capital markets with large amounts of 
capital to support new businesses and innovations. However, due to the nature of this fast evolving 
sector and heavy competition, ICT vendors focus more on the short process of introducing their 
products and services to the market and less on the security. It is challenging for insurers to follow these 
fast developments and potential risks involved in the process (Friedman, 2011). 
Recent	developments	
Government: Organizations are increasingly using Government alerts (e.g.: the UK HMG Cyber Essentials 
scheme) to inform their awareness of threats and similar vulnerabilities (PWC, 2015). Insured firms can 
get discount on insurance premium if they follow these certification requirements, so it offers 
motivations for insured users to follow security procedures and policies. 
Insurance cyber gap analysis: Marsh (2015) also suggests that it is necessary for insurance brokers to 
provide cyber gap analysis (determining which cyber risks are covered by existing traditional insurance 
or need to be covered in a standalone cyber insurance) when communicating with customers. 
Insurers’ data protection regulations: Insurance industry itself collects sensitive personal, financial and 
healthcare data from their policy holders (e.g.: personally identifiable information PII, protect health 
information PHI and business operation private information) in order to measure the customers’ risks 
more precisely. As a result, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners NAIC (2015) recently 
adopts cybersecurity guidance for the insurance industry and regulators to follow. The expertise and 
experience of insurers’ information security practice is also applied to advice their customers. 
Understanding the benefits of cyber insurance: The growing amount of literature starts to support the 
benefits of cyber insurance as a market-based solution to cybersecurity. Kesan et al. (2005) state, when 
certain obstacles to a full market solution are fully worked out, several positive outcomes will occur. In 




It is still too early to know the structure of the future, mature cyber-insurance market. In the existing 
literature, both competitive (Shetty et al., 2010b) and monopolistic (Lelarge and Bolot, 2009; Hofmann, 
2007; Pal and Golubchik, 2011) market structures are studied. 
As commonly expected, the cyber-insurance market will soon become a complex dynamic system 
(Anderson and Moore, 2009; Halse and Hoemsnes, 2013). As a result, the market not only provides one 
option of risk mitigation strategies, but also builds an eco-system together with other sectors in 
cyberspace that can influence heterogeneous stakeholders’ behaviors and business strategies (Hall et 
al., 2011). This is similar to other financial systems, such as stock or credit markets (Gracie, 2015). 
Therefore, the existing research in other financial systems will be relevant to understand the future 
cyber-insurance market (Zurich, 2014). 
3.1	Obstacles	of	developing	cyber-insurance	market	
Shetty et al. (2010a) and Bohme and Schwartz (2010) argue that the underdeveloped cyber insurance 
market is mainly due to: (1) Interdependent security (externalities) (Ogut et al., 2005; Bolot and Lelarge, 
2008; Zhao et al., 2009); (2) Correlated risk (Bohme and Kataria, 2006); and (3) Information asymmetries 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2009). Furthermore, Bohme and Schwartz (2010) argue that “it appears that the 
market failure can only be overcome if all obstacles are tackled simultaneously”. Meanwhile, Marsh 
(2015) states that a well-developed reinsurance market for cyber insurance is also one of necessary 
conditions to expand the business. 
The four key obstacles are explained as follows: 
Interdependent security (externalities): Kunreuther and Heal (2003) ask the question: “Do firms have 
adequate incentives to invest in protection against a risk whose magnitude depends on the actions of 
others?”. One of the differences between cyber and traditional insurance (e.g.: property or motor) is the 
close interconnections among players in cyberspace. The security in cyberspace is dependent on all 
players in the system, but heterogeneous players have different preferences about cybersecurity and 
the “free rider problem” occurs when those who benefit from other players’ security investment don’t 
have to pay for it (Varian, 2004). As Naghizadeh and Liu (2014) argue that security is a non-excludable 
public good, so users can stay out and still enjoy spill-overs from others’ contribution without paying. As 
a result, even insurers help their insured customers to increase their overall security, those un-insured 
players in the system still can weaken these insured customers. 
Correlated risk: Bohme and Kataria (2006) define two tiers of correlated cyber risks: (1) internal 
correlation, which they define as “the correlation of cyber-risk within a firm (i.e.: a correlated failure of 
multiple systems on the internal network), and (2) global correlation, as “the correlation of cyber-risk at 
a global level, which also appears in the insurer’s portfolio.” The growing development of Cloud 
computing platform may accelerate the two tiers to be integrated together. For example, an internal 




Information asymmetries: Bohme and Schwartz (2010) define “asymmetric information” as environment 
where some players have private information to take advantages on something that are not available to 
other players. The common issues in the conventional insurance literature due to “asymmetric 
information” are: adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard (Arrow, 1963). They are also 
relevant to the cyber-insurance market and other obstacles (e.g. the interdependent security) may 
exacerbate its problems (Shetty et al., 2010a). Furthermore, Bohme and Schwartz (2010) also identify 
specific forms of information asymmetries in cyber insurance. Meanwhile, Pal (2012) proposes three 
mechanisms (premium differentiation, fines, security auditing) to resolve information asymmetry in 
cyber insurance  
Lack of reinsurance market: It is still in the early stage for reinsurers to re-insure cyber risks from 
primary insurers, but several proposals have been put forward to build such reinsurance function 
(Toregas and Zahn, 2014), such as to establish government regulated funds similar to US Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act or UK Financial Service Compensation Scheme. Anderson et al. (2007, 2009) discuss that 
one possible option is for government to provide reinsurance, but they emphasize that “while 
government re-insurance can create insurance markets where otherwise there would be no supply, such 
measures must be carefully designed to avoid a regime in which profits are private (to the insurers’ 
shareholders), losses are socialized (born by the tac-payer), and systems remain insecure (because the 
government intervention removes the incentive to build properly secure products).” 
3.2	Technologies	spur	the	cyber-insurance	market	
Many new technologies have been developed in recent years will spur the cyber-insurance market. We 
identify some of these technologies and group them into 3 main categories: (1) IT technologies assist 
insurers to manage and discover cyber incidents, as well as attract more customers demand for cyber 
insurance; (2) Technologies and methods that are helpful for insurers to perform actuarial modelling and 
data analysis; and (3) Technologies that are useful to better understand the complexity of cyber-
insurance market. 
IT	technologies	
Some standalone technologies: Such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), firewalls, digital forensic 
technology, Microsoft Photo DNA, encryption tools have become more advanced and relevant for 
insurers to investigate cyber incidents. 
Trusted computing infrastructure: Although the opponents of trusted computing argue that users will 
lose their freedom and privacy (Anderson, 2003a,b), the technology provides insurers an opportunity of 
identifying insurable events and defining claims more precisely. 
Cloud platforms: Cloud service providers can reduce the issues of misaligned incentives between 
insurers and cloud users, if they can collaborate with insurers to attract more customers. Meanwhile, 
automated systems reduce human errors in the computing process. However, on the other hand, the 
cloud platform may lead to systemic risk since they are connected to other IT systems. 
Anonymous communication and transactions: The anonymity network that is currently represented by 
e.g. Tor software makes cyber criminals “anonymous” and untraceable. Anonymous digital currencies 
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allow sophisticated markets for illicit goods and services (Juels, Kosba & Shi 2015). As a result, there is a 
deep/dark web that provides a cyber black market for attackers to trade sensitive information (e.g.: 
selling stolen credit card information to other parties, etc), so the attackers’ motivation of attacking any 
organizations become larger.  
Mobile devices: Nowadays, more and more business activities and collaborations are based on mobile 
devices (e.g.: Bring Your Own Devices). This leads more cyber incidents that require cyber insurance, 
since such as devices are lost or stolen easily and users do not have sufficient skills to manage the 
security on these mobile devices. 
Leaking technology:  ICT enables rapid copying and dissemination of information, making information 
leaks harder to contain. In the past a sizeable leak of proprietary information (such as the more than 40 
gigabytes of internal data released in the 2014 Sony hack) would have been limited by the need to 
transmit it by sending hard drives (expensive) or setting up a website (legally traceable and blockable); 
by 2014 it could be distributed anonymously using bittorrent in a way that makes it impossible to trace 
and block. In addition, leaks are potentiated by the appearance of search tools making released data 
more accessible. 
Actuarial	modelling	methods	
Network simulator: Similar to stress and scenario testing that are commonly used in the financial 
markets (e.g. banking system), insurers can use various applications and services to run network 
simulation in an artificial environment in order to test the stability and resilience of insured network 
under different conditions. 
Actuarial data analysis (big data analytics): More and more professional consulting service firms have 
been investing and offering advanced actuarial pricing and risk management services based on big data 
analytics to assist insurers uncovering hidden patterns and unknown correlations in cyber risks. 
Data pooling platform (data anonymization): Technologies of information sanitization that aim to 
encrypt or remove sensitive information from data sets are becoming more feasible, this encourages 
more data to be shared in the pooling platform in order to help government and insurers to better 
understand cyber risks from aggregated data sets. 
Machine learning and Bayesian networks: More and more applications from these sub-fields of 
computer science are used in understanding the cyber risks. Insurers will hopefully gain insights about 
managing the cyber risks from these developments. Yang and Lui (2014) apply Bayesian network to 
analyze the influence of cyber-insurance market to security adoption in heterogeneous networks. 
Data visualization: According to the “digital detectives” website of Microsoft, advances in data 
visualization technology assist Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (uses Microsoft PowerMap) to understand 
the pattern of Citadel botnets better and remove the malware from infected machines more efficiently 
(Constantin, 2013). The same technologies will help insurers to identify cyber incidents from different 
malware or causes, so they can distinguish the incidents in order to reduce specific claims (similar to 
distinguish different risk events in natural catastrophe insurance) or issue insurance-linked securities 
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based on specified triggers (cyber incident) earlier. Anderson et al. (2007) consider one of potential 
strategies to promote cyber insurance is to develop financial instruments for risk sharing similar to “Cat 
Bonds” and “Exploit Derivatives” in the traditional insurance business operations (e.g.: flood and 
natural-disaster insurance). As Anderson et al. (2007) explain “Exploit Derivatives are vehicles for 
insurers to hedge against the discovery of vulnerabilities that causes significant loss events across their 
portfolios. ” 
Socio-technical	systems	
Security awareness training and behavioral games: Toregas and Zahn (2014) mention a growing 
consensus that cyber security is not achievable by solely focusing on technological aspects, but also 
requiring to understand both technologies and their users’ behaviors. The importance of understanding 
human-computer interaction has been studied widely since the works of Adams and Sasse (1999) and 
Sasse et al. (2001). Recently, some behavioral digital games based on computer simulations are 
introduced to train the users’ behavior and awareness of using technologies securely (Cone et al., 2007). 
Existing interdisciplinary research in financial systems: Bohme (2010b) argues that some key obstacles 
causing cyber-insurance market failure are due to a lack of understanding information economics. An 
interdisciplinary and integrated research that focus on a cyber eco-system is better than targeting each 
individual technological elements alone (Bohme, 2010a). This idea is similar to recent progress of 
understanding systemic risks in the financial markets. Schneier (2002) and Anderson and Moore (2007, 
2009) state that a combination of economics, game theory and psychology is necessary to understand 
and manage cybersecurity in the modern and future networked environment. Johnson et al. (2011) 
model security games with market insurance to inform policy makers on adjusting incentives to improve 
network security and cyber-insurance market. Baddeley (2011) applies some lessons from Behavioural 
Economics to under issues of information security. More papers on the economics of information 
security and privacy can be found in the book of Moore et al. (2010). 
Multi-agent technique: Agent-based approach of modelling a complex system is becoming popular in the 
financial markets, but it is not commonly used by researchers to model cyberspace or perform stress 
testing on particular cyber events. Recently, a few researchers start to apply this technique to model 
network resilience (Sifalakis et al., 2010; Baxter and Sommerville, 2011; Sommerville et al., 2012). 
4.	General	Categorization	of	Cyber	Risks	
 In the previous analysis we presented the literature related to the evolution of cyber-insurance. It is our 
intention to further examine the challenges for the development of a cyber-insurance market. ‘’An 
understanding of insurance must begin with the concept of risk—that is, the variation in possible 
outcomes of a situation’’ (Zeckhauser, 2008). We embark on a theoretical and empirical analysis, using 
examples of cyber security events, in order to better understand cyber risks and relate them to cyber 
security.  
The first crucial observation is that numerous different things can be included under the term ‘’cyber 




• (Cyber) Risk, can be defined as a measurable quantity, according to Knight (1921). In that sense 
probability distributions could be assigned to cyber threats. It is thus it is feasible to quantify the 
(cyber) risks and consequently estimate insurance premiums.  
• (Cyber) Uncertainty, can be considered to be the unmeasurable quantity related to cyber 
events. Therefore, we do not know the states of the world and he precise probabilities would 
not be known. It is also known as Knightian Uncertainty, based on the classic distinction by 
Frank Knight (1921).  
• (Cyber) Ignorance can be considered a third category, when we may not have the ability to 
define what states of the world are possible (Zeckhauser and Viscusi, 2008). It can be considered 
one step further from uncertainty, when some potential outcomes are unknowable or unknown 
(Zeckhauser, 2006). There are two important types of ignorance. Primary Ignorance concerns 
situations in which one does not recognize that is ignorant and Recognized Ignorance, when one 
perceives that ignorance (Roy and Zeckhauser, 2013). For example the financial meltdown of 
2008 can be considered such an event. It can also be argued that many catastrophic risks are 
subject to ignorance. 
4.2	Catastrophic	Risks	and	Insurance		
4.2.1	General	Description	of	Catastrophic	Risks	
The above general categorization brings us to further types of risk that influence cyber insurance. 
‘’Catastrophes provide the predominant conceptual model of what insurance is about. One pays 
premiums to secure financial protection against low-probability high consequence events – what we 
normally call catastrophes.’’ (Zeckhauser, 1996, a, b). The main problem is that private markets are 
facing difficulties in providing coverage for catastrophic risk and thus they can be deemed ‘’uninsurable 
risk’’. (Jaffee and Russell, 1997).  
The timing and consequence of catastrophic events may largely vary. We have already identified the 
frequency/severity spectrum used for cyber events. In other words the catastrophic risks fall within the 
Low Probability – High Consequence class (Kleindorfer and Kunreuther, 1999). However the probabilities 
and consequences are not clearly defined, particularly towards the upper end of losses.  
In this chapter we are more interested about the insurers’ perspective on assessing such risks. The 
Actuarial Standard Board defines ‘’Catastrophe – A relative infrequent event of phenomenon that 
produces unusually large aggregate losses’’. More precisely, ‘’An event is designated a catastrophe by 
the industry when claims are expected to reach a certain dollar threshold, currently set at $25 million, 
and more than a certain number of policyholders and insurance companies are affected.’’(Insurance 
Information Institute, 2015). In that sense, numerous cyber events, as we would examine later, can have 
the rarity and loss magnitude of catastrophic risks.  
However, catastrophes can involve a loss much greater than $ 25 million. The Swiss Re sigma study 
describes catastrophe losses. In 2014, total insured and uninsured losses due to disasters were 
estimated at $ 110 billion (Swiss Re, 2015). This number is below the inflation adjusted 10 year average 
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of $ 200 billion and lower than $138 billion in 2013. However the number of natural disaster 
catastrophes was at a record high reaching 189, and in total there were 336 disaster events.  
This variation in total losses and the number of catastrophes, partly displays their unpredictability as 
well as their severe consequences. By doing simple calculations, we can observe that the average loss 
per catastrophe is much higher than $25 million (insurance covered claims of USD 28 billion of losses 
from natural catastrophes and USD 7 billion from man-made disasters). There are two major categories 
regarding the causes of catastrophic risks:  
• Natural disasters, including georisks (like earthquakes) and Climate induced Risks (as hurricanes 
and floods)  
• Man-made Catastrophes can be considered a broader category and it includes industrial 
accidents and terrorist attacks (Zurich, 2013).  
Earthquakes can have devastating effects for insurers but also situations where thousands of women 
claim to be damaged by breast implants or individuals harmed by asbestos (Zeckhauser, 1996, a, b). This 
example, except making the distinction between natural and man-made disasters, presents some 
interesting features that could be used for some initial comments about cyber risks.  
A feature is that natural disasters are usually localized (geo specific). The same can apply to cyber 
events. A system failure in an energy grid can have local effects. Nevertheless there are many cases, let 
us say a computer virus, that can have regional or global impacts. Cyberspace is by its nature fairly 
nonlocal, and there are fewer “natural boundaries” that constrain the size of an impact. This makes 
these breaches rather easily diffuse around the world, therefore resulting in widespread damage.  
Also, it seems that a disproportionately larger number man-made breaches and disasters occur in 
cyberspace (PWC, 2015): actually it can be argued that there are very few cases in which the human 
factor is not involved. While the majority may be unintentional, intentional incidents have the potential 
for particularly expensive damage. 
4.2.2	Aggregate	Catastrophes	and	Systemic	Risks		
‘’Aggregate catastrophes occur when many similarly situated people, all subject to common risks, 
suddenly find that they have suffered a loss, and the total losses exceed expectations’’.  (Zeckhauser, 
1996, a, b). The single worst incident suffered by an organization might be considered to be a measure 
for informing us about catastrophic risks, especially in large corporations. Infection of viruses or 
malicious software remains the largest single worst incident causal factor (PWC, 2015). As argued above, 
viruses and malware have the ability to propagate rapidly and cause harm to various people and 
organizations. 
In that sense, we can further decompose the High Consequence characteristic. One dimension is the 
number of individuals and organization that a cyber event might affect. Another dimension is the 
geographic location where the cyber event takes place. Some cyber events might have global reach, 
enlarging the consequences.  
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An additional critical parameter is the importance of the individuals and organization for the economy 
and society. A cyber attack on Critical Infrastructure can further enlarge the consequence by generating 
losses to other operations. For example, the failure of VISA or MASTERCARD systems would not only 
result in losses for these companies but it would likely generate significant losses to other businesses.  
This would apply to other Critical (Information) Infrastructure, and the losses could be identified 
according to the importance of the system for the operations of other individuals and organizations.  
4.2.3	Global	Aggregations	of	Cyber	Risk		
A report by Zurich and the Atlantic Council attempts to expose ‘’global aggregations of cyber risk’’ as 
analogous to the risks associated with the U.S. sub-prime and 2008 financial crisis. ‘’Governments and 
forward looking organizations need to take a holistic view and look beyond these issues to broader risks, 
including the increasing danger of global shocks initiated and amplified by the  interconnected nature of 
the internet’’ (Zurich, 2014). An illustrative analogy between the financial markets and the Information 
Technology of organizations is over-leverage (Zurich, 2014). Over-leverage of companies in financial 
markets was created due to excessive debt, while organizations can over-leverage in IT due to 
overreliance on technology solutions. In both cases leverage is used to maximize their returns, however 
it is likely that the associated risks were underestimated, as it was proved by the financial crisis.   
There are two crucial elements in this discussion. The first is a ‘’Lehman moment’’, a catastrophic event 
that would spread in the web and cause major losses. Nevertheless a ‘’Lehman moment’’ would 
encompass ignorance. While it was anticipated that Lehman Brothers could go bankrupt, none could 
foresee the chain of events that it triggered and led to the global financial crisis of 2008.  In that sense 
even catastrophic events that seem to have a specific impact might actually end in unpredictable 
outcomes.  The original ‘’Lehman moment’’ can be regarded a global shock due to the scale of Lehman 
Brothers operations across the world. However, the channel that initially cascaded this global shock was 
rather localized; the U.S. subprime market.  
The other element comprises of the propagation mechanism. The complexity and interconnections of 
financial products and markets, eventually transmitted this shock around the globe. The complexity of 
financial products might be a useful analogy to the increasing complexity of IT systems. It has been 
argued that the 2008 financial crisis is a demonstration that the causes of risks were camouflaged by 
excess complexity (Zurich, 2014). Even if this complexity is not excessive, it is still difficult to understand 
and predict the cascading risks and channels. Another analogy of the internet with the financial markets 
is that risks were assumed not to be correlated with each other. Nevertheless this is far from true: 
financial products and markets can be highly correlated. The same applies to Information Technology 
operations and systems.  
In that sense it is not only complexity per se but also complexity due to the interconnected nature of 
risks that add to the uncertainty (Zurich, 2014). Thus, complexity and interconnections can facilitate 
systemic problems when ‘extreme events’, as global shocks, occur. ‘’Connecting to the internet means 
exposure to nth-order effects – risks from interconnections with and dependencies on’’ other risk 
aggregations (Zurich, 2014). The report by Zurich identifies seven such aggregations (Internal IT 
enterprise, Counterparties and partners,  Outsourced and contract, supply chain, disruptive 
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technologies, upstream infrastructure, external shocks)  It can be however argued that due to ignorance 
they can be more common, or more severe, than expected (for example external shocks). An addition 
issue is a possible ‘’perfect storm’’. Especially if a cyber ‘’Lehman moment’’ coincides with other events, 
this interaction could cause losses of much larger scope, duration and intensity, similar to the series of 
events of the 2008 financial crisis (Zurich, 2014). It is even more difficult or rather impossible to identify 
and define the interconnections between other events and a ‘’Lehman moment’’ before it happens, 
since it is principally unpredictable. In the worst case, catastrophic events would coincide and can 
significantly multiply the damage. This makes mitigation of risks increasingly difficult, if the outcomes 
are unknown or unknowable.  
4.2.4	Global	Catastrophic	Risks	Framework		
A very useful framework in order to qualitative describe globally catastrophic or existential catastrophes 
was developed by Nick Bostrom (Bostrom and Cirkovic 2011, Bostrom (2013)). This framework is based 
on three factors: severity (how badly the population would be affected), scope (the size of the 
population at risk) and probability (how likely the disaster is likely to occur, according to the most 
reasonable judgement given currently available evidence). This model uses the first two factors and 
presents many advantages and flexibility. The scope includes not just the spatial size of the risk variable 
that we descried earlier but also, generational effects that are important regarding the duration and 
aftermath of the catastrophe.  
Nevertheless, the major advantage of this framework is the way it treats probability. ‘’Probability can be 
understood in different senses…The uncertainty and error-proneness…of risk is itself something we 
must factor into our all-things considered probability assignments. This factor often dominates in low-
probability high-consequence risks – especially those involving poorly understood natural phenomena, 
complex social dynamics, or new technology, or are that difficult to assess for other reasons’’ (Bostrom, 
2013). Therefore, this facilitates our analysis since most of the factors discussed above can be adapted 
to this framework. Scope encompasses both geographic spread, number of affected actors, and the 
importance of the damage. Moreover, its flexibility allows adding other concepts. In the discussion that 
follows, because the uncertainty and ignorance surrounding the estimation of probabilities we would 
shortly discuss about plausibility. Plausibility can be used as a distinct alternative to probabilities 




Figure 2: Qualitative risk categories from (Bostrom 2013). 
 
4.3	Interdependencies	and	Asymmetric	Threats		
We have discussed correlations and interconnections. Special mention should be attributed to 
Interdependencies, a related concept and relevant to cyber risks. Often these concepts are used 
interchangeably and denote the same thing. However we would like to expand our analysis by focusing 
on complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane and Nye, 1998), since it can provide an 
additional theoretical foundation. First of all, it should be emphasized that the context of international 
relations is central to insurance. Except political risk insurance, state relations influence numerous 
macro risk factors, as economic relations and defense and security. ‘’The information revolution alters 
patterns of complex interdependence by exponentially increasing the number of channels of 
communication in world politics’’ (Keohane and Nye, 1998).  
In addition, commercial and particularly, strategic information are valuable. The availability and 
confidentiality of such information in multiple channels increases the level of risk. Information can be 
used to convince and capture terrorists, prevent and resolve conflicts and enable countries to defeat 
adversaries (Nye and Owens, 1996). On the other hand because information reduces the ‘’costs, 
economies of scale, and barriers of entry to markets, it should reduce the power of large states and 
enhance the power of small states and non-state actors’’ (Keohane and Nye, 1998).  
This generates important asymmetries. A small group of hackers could disrupt, a relatively to their size 
and resources, large IT system. Another notable case is that of WikiLeaks: a single leak, amplified by a 
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single disseminating organization, has global consequences for a superpower.  Asymmetric threats and 
the enabling of non-state actors adds even more complexity to the layers described before. The number 
of threats is therefore multiplied and consequently risks increase. Moreover, ambiguity regarding the 
nature and identification of these relative small actors makes the estimation of risks quite 
unpredictable.  
4.4	Cyber	Risks	and	Losses		
Before 1989 the insurance industry did not experience a loss of more than $ 1 billion from a single event 
and since then catastrophes of the same magnitude have occurred (Kleinndorfer and Kunrether, 1999). 
As more and more people with larger insured wealth congregate in coastal areas this is to expect (even 
leaving out climate change). ‘’Megacatastrophes’’, like Hurricane Andrew, seem therefore to happen 
more often and clearly demonstrate the limitations of relying on historical data in order to estimate 
future probabilities of losses (Actuarial Standard Board, 2000). Not only there are limitations to 
historical data but also cyber risks are new phenomena with continuously evolving technology and 
factors that are difficult to predict or even imagine. However, it is argued that there is likelihood for a 
global cyber catastrophic event (Zurich, 2014).  
There are important methodological problems regarding probability estimation when assessing global 
catastrophic risks (Ord et al., 2010). Due to their high severity and scope even low probability risks need 
to be managed, but the probability of theory, model or calculation error in doing so is far higher than 
the risk probability itself, even when done carefully. This means that risk estimates should be regarded 
as suspect unless bounded by several independent estimates or other constraints. 
A major concern for the private insurance industry is that it might not be able to provide coverage for 
some catastrophic events without the possibility of insolvency or a significant loss (Kleindorfer and 
Kunreuther, 1999). This is intensified when the scope and severity of the disaster are high. In the event 
of a ‘cyber sub-prime’ the losses can be massive and potentially result to insolvency. Even more worried 
would be the possibility of interconnected events that could amplify such crisis. The coincidence of 
catastrophes or a perfect storm would also have devastating effects. It is therefore essential to try and 
understand the cyber risks that can affect insurance. In this part to attempted to provide a theoretical 
analysis of risks in order to understand better cyber insurance. In the next part we attempt to put some 
flesh to this theoretical skeleton by providing real and imaginary examples.  
5.	Cyber	Risks,	Catastrophes	and	Ignorance		
5.1	Identifying	Cyber	Risks		
The discussion above indicated that the estimation of probabilities regarding cyber risks is in many cases 
difficult or impossible. The common methods are based on past events in order to define catastrophes 
and identify potential losses. These methods present significant limitations. There are various reasons 
for that. First of all cyberspace is a very dynamic environment. Information and Communication 
Technologies are continuously changing. The internet is constantly expanding. It is embedding existing 
devices and technologies, and is likely to integrate future innovations, generating the Internet of Things 
(IoT). The number of interconnected devices, individuals and organizations is therefore increasing. This 
18 
 
results in larger complexity and interdependence among devices with currently unknown functions and 
vulnerabilities.  
In that sense if we assume that we know all the causes of potential losses then it might be a display of 
primary ignorance. On the contrary we can recognize our ignorance. We attempt to examine practical 
examples of cyber risks in three ways. The first is though the traditional approach on historic events. The 
second technique can be considered an expansion of that. We can infer based on historical events and 
develop potential cases, subject to uncertainty. Finally, we would build imaginary but plausible scenarios 
(Ramirez and Selin, 2014) in order to better understand cyber uncertainty and push the boundaries of 
ignorance.  It can be said, that effective scenario formation and imagining might reduce ambiguity, enter 
the space of ignorance and therefore diminish it.  
 
5.2	Existential	and	Global	Catastrophic	Risks		
Bostrom’s classification was developed in regard to threats to the entire future of the human species, or 
“merely” global disasters. The cyber counterpart would be risks that can escalate to such a level that 
they disrupt the global market or indeed current civilization. They are not merely uninsurably large, but 
terminal to most existing actors. 
One possible example might be misuse of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Autonomous “smart” systems have 
already demonstrated potential for economically significant misbehavior such as the 2010 “Flash Crash”, 
which at least in part was due to a systemic interaction of automatic trading agents.  As technology 
advances AI is likely to become more powerful and ubiquitous, but there are significant control 
problems that remain to be solved. The fundamental issue is that superintelligent systems do not 
generally behave in human-compatible ways, and this can produce existential risk (Bostrom, 2013). 
More plausible scenarios involve unpredictable AI actions that are deliberate, autonomous and 
potentially very tenacious. It might include the paralysis of the internet globally by AI software 
embedded in the web infrastructure, or by automated adaptive hacking tools (e.g. descendants of the 
current DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge). In another scenario of endurable severity and local scope, AI 
systems can involve the disruption of operations in an organization. Of course severity may vary as well 
as scope. For example, if there is failure of ICT systems in a healthcare organization, it could result to 
loss of human lives. The disaster can diffuse globally if AI of a wide spread logistics database system 
decides not to allow access to information, or even worse, altering or destroying it (for example, 
because it interprets restoration or circumvention attempts as intrusion attempts). However, due to the 
fact that the capabilities of AI are very ambiguous, such scenarios are difficult to define.  
It may be that there are workable solutions or that AI will never be too powerful, but these are risky 
bets. It seems that it is easy for people to overestimate their knowledge regarding AI (Yudkowsky, 2011). 
‘’It may be tempting to ignore Artificial Intelligence because, of all the global risk …AI is hardest to 
discuss. We cannot consult actuarial statistics to assign small annual probabilities of catastrophe, as with 
asteroid strikes. We cannot use calculations from a precise, precisely confirmed model to rule out 
events or place infinitesimal upper bounds on their probability, as with proposed physics disasters. But 
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this makes AI catastrophes more worrisome, not less.’’ (Yudkowsky, 2011).  In that sense AI qualifies for 
uncertainty and ignorance. AI represents a risk that could go all the way into the extreme upper right 
hand box of the framework, but is both extremely uncertain and largely a future risk: it can be dealt with 
by R&D aimed at safe and beneficial uses of AI. 
However, cyber risk also has strong interconnections to traditional catastrophic risks.  Such risks include 
major technical disasters, conflict and war, and particularly total war with the use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD).  
The threat of a nuclear disaster is the most notable case by far. This is due to Stuxnet, a complex piece 
of malware interfering with Siemens industrial control systems and speculated that it was used for Iran 
nuclear program (NATO, 2013). Based on this precedent it can be argued that a nuclear catastrophe can 
be realized. The scale of these risks could largely vary. Cirincione (2011) and Ackerman and Potter (2011) 
discuss the global catastrophic risks of nuclear war and catastrophic nuclear terrorism. In both cases 
cyberspace is ‘’enabling’’ these risks. In addition, the internet could provide the most cost – effective 
opportunity for adversaries. It enables states and non state actors and enhances their power. They can 
transform their capabilities and become nuclear threats that was not imaginable in the past. These 
asymmetric threats impose great challenges to insurance.  
Stuxnet is considered to be a government cyber weapon. Rogue states might dedicate more resources in 
attaining such capabilities. The same could apply with terrorist groups. It is interesting to notice the 
multiple channels and complexity surrounding them. States relations can deteriorate and governments 
might decide to pursue cyber weapons targeting at nuclear as well as other military and critical 
infrastructure targets. The emergence of terrorists groups is also subject to uncertainty and ignorance. 
The rapid emergence of Islamic State, raising considerable resources, was not forecasted. Hamas and 
Hezbollah were established terrorist organizations and it can be alleged that they were capable of using 
cyber space. Nevertheless, it was believed by Israeli officials that these organizations used a criminal 
organization based in a former Soviet State to attack Israel’s internet infrastructure during the January 
2009 military offensive in the Gaza Strip (NATO, 2013).  
Cyber weapons can also easily be spread to other actors, through theft or leakage (such as the exploits 
revealed in the attack on the security consultancy Hacking Team in 2015), trade, or by imitation: once 
Stuxnet was out in the wild, many other groups could analyze it and copy its tricks into their toolkits. The 
market for zero day exploits, driven by governments and security companies seeking new tools, has 
both the effect of incentivizing search for more vulnerabilities and inhibiting public disclosure of them 
since discoverers can gain more by secretly selling their find and agencies using them do not wish to lose 
their advantage. Even when vulnerabilities are revealed removing them is sometimes hard since they 
might be embedded in systems that cannot easily be upgraded (such as industrial systems or implants); 
this means that use of some cyber weapons can lead to more subsequent attacks on targets unrelated 
to the original target. 
This case highlights the complexity generated by multiple channels and agents. It is consistent with the 
concept of n-th order effects (Zurich, 2014). The potential cooperation of different agents enhances 
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complexity due to the exponential number of combinations. Nexuses of adversaries can be formed, 
pooling resources and capabilities and thus magnifying cyber attacks. Nuclear catastrophes can have 
regional or global consequences (Cirincione, 2011) according to their intensity. Similar cyber global 
catastrophic scenarios can involve other types of WMD (i.e. Biological Weapons) or conflict and war.  
5.3	Catastrophic	Risks	
War and conflict enabled by cyber space can present variations in consequences and scale. They can be 
also interdependent to other complex events. The cyber attack on Estonia in April 2007 was caused due 
to political frictions with Russia. On August 2008 the conflict of Russia and Georgia was accompanied by 
hacking activity from unknown foreign intruders which appeared to coincide with Russian military 
actions (NATO, 2013). A crucial observation is that the manmade causes of these cyber attacks are still 
not known with certainty. Another critical remark is that there are interdependencies between 
traditional kinetic power and cyber capabilities. An analogous example to the above cases is the 
takeover of missiles systems by hackers (there are claims this briefly happened to a German Patriot anti-
aircraft defense system in 2015 (Storm 2015)). An action by hackers launching missiles could escalate to 
conflict or war.  
Now imagine that these missiles are stationed in South Korea. And that they are launched by unknown 
hackers just after the cyber-attack on Sony, that FBI blamed on Pyongyang (BBC, 2015). Sony was about 
to release the Interview, a comedy about the assassination of the North Korea’s Leader, indicating that 
the tensions in North Korea were running high. This could trigger events that could escalate to a 
catastrophe involving even nuclear weapons. A crisis in Korea could also cause negative impact on global 
markets due to the importance of the South Korean economy and trade interconnections. This example 
presents just a small part of complex interdependencies.  
This example could have been even worse. Imagine now that the aforementioned events coincide with a 
release on WikiLeaks that North Korea is abandoned and isolated (a previous WikiLeaks cable suggested 
that Chinese officials expressed the desire to relinquish support for North Korea (The Economist, 2010)). 
North Korea can increase its level of alertness and retaliate severely, if they feel that the balance of 
power has changed against them and the regime is under existential threat. If these events coincide, 
then it is more likely to have a catastrophe. It is also possible that these events are fabricated and lead 
to an ‘accident’. It is important to realize the multiple layers of complex interdependencies, which in 
many occasions can be unpredictable. The “WikiLeaks paradigm” is noteworthy because it can generate 
the conditions and instability which can consequently trigger other disasters.   
In January 2011 the Canadian government reported an attack against its Department of National 
Defense as well as the Finance Department and Treasury Board, causing the disconnection of the main 
Canadian economic agencies from the internet (NATO, 2013).  Once again there is ambiguity regarding 
the identity of attackers, and in addition Canadian counter-espionage agents were left scrambling to find 
how much sensitive information was compromised (Weston on CBC News, 2011). In that sense, it is not 
only difficult to forecast cyber-attacks but it is also unclear how much loss they caused. This makes 
mitigation harder. A proof of that is that cyber-attacks disrupted again the Department of Finance and 
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Treasury Board (MacDonald and King on WSJ, 2015). Thus, cyber-attacks are repeated with frequency on 
the same Critical Infrastructure.   
Although these cyber – attacks might not qualify for catastrophic risks, it is hard to estimate the losses 
and associated costs. A considerable loss is the opportunity cost for not using the economic 
infrastructure of the Department of Finance and Treasury Board. Except Stuxnet, earlier, in 2003 
Slammer worm disabled safety monitors in nuclear facilities and later, in October 2011, the Duqu Trojan 
hit Iran’s nuclear facilities (Vaidya, 2015). This is another indication of the frequency of cyber - attacks 
on nuclear facilities, that could easily lead to major catastrophes.  
Not only nuclear facilities are targeted but also energy infrastructure has experienced cyber-attacks. A 
notable case is Shamoon malware which destroyed 30,000 computers of Saudi Aramco in August of 
2012. Interestingly enough, 5 days later a similar attack forced RasGas, one of the largest producers of 
liquid petroleum gas, to shut down its website and e-mails (BBC, 2012).  Despite that it was not reported 
oil and gas supply was not disrupted, inference to these cases points that in the future this is a plausible 
consequence. Especially similar cyber - attacks can create shocks to the global economy due to 
interconnections, if they coincide with other events affecting the price of energy.  
We have mainly focused on cyber events that produce high consequence outcomes on a single or small 
number of organizations affected. Nevertheless another important category of cyber events is when 
they have impact on a wide range of individuals and organizations. This type of events is likely to 
generate systemic global catastrophes.  There are numerous examples. In respect to losses some cases 
are distinct. Code Red Worm as early as July 2001 infected 359,000 computers in less than 14 hours and 
caused estimated losses of $ 2.6 billion, Mydoom in 2004  skyrocketed losses to $38.5 billion, Conficker 
in 2008 infecting 11 million hosts with an estimated loss of $ 9.1 billion and the list is long (Vaidya, 
2015). It should be noted that these disasters are systemic and with correlated global effects. They can 
therefore be considered potential ‘’Lehman moments’’ for cyber insurance.  
6.	Conclusion:	Summary,	Challenges	and	Future	Directions,	The	development	
of	the	Cyber	Insurance	Market	
Cyber risks are rapidly evolving due to technological change and the systemic and complex nature of the 
ICT world, producing fundamental uncertainty and ignorance. Cyber insurance typically focuses on the 
less uncertain risks or constrains uninsurable risks to make them more manageable. Tools or practices 
for handling interdependent security, correlation, and information asymmetries as well as the lack of 
reinsurance would help the market grow.  
While there are some cyber risks for which we can have sufficient information for quantifiable 
estimates, in the majority of cases uncertainty and ignorance prevail. This reflects the very limited, if 
any, information regarding the nature and evolution of cyberattacks. There are two basic problems in 
obtaining information. The first concerns the identity of attackers. The agents responsible for cyber 
threats present a large variety. They can range from large nations and militaries to organized crime and 
activists. The second issue, somewhat related to the first, are the resources and skills of these agents. 
The skills and sophistication can also substantially vary.  
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There are examples of single hackers that managed to cause catastrophic damage – like Michael Calce 
aka “MafiaBoy” – who has caused an estimated $ 1.2 bn damage with attacks on CNN, Dell, e-Bay and 
Amazon (Niccolai, 2000; Harris, 2006). Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) are getting more involved in 
cyber crime, and trends suggest considerable increases in scope, sophistication, number and types of 
attacks, number of victims and economic damage (Europol, 2014). Nevertheless except traditional OCGs 
that leverage their existing criminal activity there are many new organized criminals focusing solely on 
cyber crime. They are capable of building sophisticated and complex systems for stealing money and 
intellectual property at a ‘’grand scale’’ and it has been reported that in former Soviet Union there are 
20 to 30 criminal groups that have reached ‘’nation-state level’’ capabilities (Ranger 2014).   
It has been argued that many governments are developing their cyber offensive and defensive 
capabilities, and most particularly cyber intelligence operations. U.S. is further ‘’aggressively’’ enhancing 
its cyber capabilities. This is because of claims by officials about serious cyber threats from China and 
occurrence of high magnitude attacks, for example on Sony from North Korea (Mason and Hosenball 
2015). There is considerable uncertainty and ignorance regarding the nature and source of many 
threats. Often the perpetrating agents cannot be identified. On top of that, there are allegations that 
some governments might employ hackers or even organized cyber criminals. In this dynamic 
environment, threat agents can easily change identity and diffuse their knowledge and innovative 
technologies. At the same time much information regarding these threats or attacks might remain 
unknown. Finally cyberterrorist acts have been anticipated, but none can predict their potential scale. 
An analogy with the unexpected rise of Islamic State (IS) might be drawn.  
In general it is very hard or in some cases seems impossible to have information and predict the 
frequency and magnitude of cyberattacks. At the same it is also difficult to estimate the potential losses 
from cyberattacks due to interdependencies that can propagate shocks and strongly correlated risks. 
These, along with limited information regarding the reputation loss, opportunity cost from operation 
interruptions, valuation of intellectual property, among others, impose significant barriers to the 
development of insurance markets. In that sense uninsurable risks can remain. Nevertheless building 
better insurance and financial models, as some actuarial models referred above, is a first step to better 
understand and estimate cybersisks and relate them to insurance premiums. On top of that, incentives, 
regulation and liability provisions, new technologies for better security and investment in secure 
infrastructure can diminish some risks and facilitate the further development of cyber insurance 
markets.  
It may be that these barriers are insurmountable, or that currently undiscovered tools – whether 
technological, actuarial or social – are ready to be found.  The challenge is extremely hard, involving 
management of systemic risks with elements of extreme uncertainty and ignorance, but the market 
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